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4ABSTRACT
From neutral trade policy devices employed to identity country
of origin of commodities, the rules of origin are emerging as protectionist
tools.  Nation-states, as they are increasingly denied of conventional
trade policy tools, are reasserting themselves by evolving new and less
visible weapons of intervention. The misuse of rules of origin as
protectionist tools is widely reported from PTAs among developed
countries, such as EEC and NAFTA.  More recently, non-preferential
rules of origin are also being used for protectionist purpose.  It is such
protectionist adaptation of the rules of origin that prompted the WTO to
launch the HWP to evolve common rules of origin for all countries. The
present study is a critique of the harmonization work programme. The
central objective of the ARO and also the HWP is to ensure that the rules
of origin are employed without/ or with least trade distorting effects.
But, as our study shows, it would be too optimistic to expect such an
outcome from the HWP. On the contrary, even if it is successfully
completed, the HWP is likely to leave considerable scope for misuse of
rules of origin for protectionist purpose.  Further, the new multilateral
regime, even if it succeeds in establishing semblance of an order in the
arena of rules of origin, is likely to have unequal effects on members.
The moot question is as to whether the adopted harmonised rules match
the trading interests of the developing nations.  The picture emerging
from our analysis of outstanding disputes is not very encouraging for
the developing countries. They belong mainly to the traditional areas
of western protectionism against developing countries. The fear that the
developed countries are trying to manipulate rules of origin to
compensate for the loss of tariff and other conventional barriers, therefore,
cannot be ruled out.
Key Words:   World Trade Organisation, Protectionism,  Rules  of  Origin,
Harmonisation Work  Programme,  Nationality of
Products,  Wholly Obtained Goods,  Substantial
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5Introduction
The history of ‘rules of origin’, i.e., the criteria for determining the
national source of origin of products, must be as old as the practice of
discriminatory commercial policy by nation states1 . As modern nation
states got consolidated and as they began to employ discriminatory
commercial policy tools there arose the need to identify the country of
origin of commodities. Rules of origin have become an essential part of
any trade policy regime, for commercial policy tools, more often than
not, discriminate among countries. Administration of quotas, preferential
tariffs, anti-dumping actions, countervailing duties, government
procurement, etc, requires clearly defined rules of origin. The rules of
origin are also important for application of labeling and marketing
requirements as well as for collection of trade statistics. But, the process
of determining origin might have been relatively easy and dispute free
until recently, because production of individual commodities rarely
involved more than one country. It is the growing internationalization
of production and consequent involvement of more than one country in
the production of most commodities that made the origin of commodities
a contested terrain.
6Even though rules of origin are supposed to be used as devices to
support implementation of trade policy instruments, their misuse, which
has become quite rampant in recent times, transform them into trade
policy instruments per se2 . It is a widely acknowledged fact that as the
GATT rounds succeeded in reducing the height of the tariff walls and
the incidence of other overt barriers, the contracting parties, especially
the industrialized ones, tended to resort to less transparent, covert
measures of protection. It is such misuse the rules of origin that
necessitated the Uruguay Round (The WTO) agreement on rules of origin
(hereafter ARO). The ARO requires WTO members to ensure that their
rules of origin are transparent; that they do not have restricting, distorting,
or disruptive effects on international trade; that they are administered in
a consistent, uniform, impartial and reasonable manner and that they are
based on positive standards. The long-term goal of the agreement is to
harmonise non-preferential rules of origin so that the same criteria are
applied by the WTO members whatever the purpose for which they are
applied.
The distinction that the ARO makes between preferential and non-
preferential rules of origin is important to be emphasised here because
the former are excluded from the harmonization work programme of the
ARO.  The preferential rules of origin are those applied in the context of
preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) such as customs unions, free
trade areas or even non-reciprocal arrangements like the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP).  Whereas the non-preferential rules of origin
are those used in non-preferential commercial policy instruments such
as most favoured nation tariffs, anti-dumping and countervailing duties,
safeguard measures, origin marking requirements, and any
discriminatory quantitative restrictions or tariff quotas. The non-
preferential rules also include those used for government procurement
and trade statistics.
7Defined in a general sense the proposed study is intended to be a
broad critique of the WTO proposals on common rules of origin. The
critique, however, is undertaken mainly from the point of view of
implications of the new rules for south Asian countries, especially India.
The introduction of the Harmonised rules of origin would essentially
mean a two-way movement away from status quo. First, the exporting
member countries would encounter a shift in the rules of origin of the
importing countries towards the new harmonised rules of the WTO.
Needless to say that this will have implications for market access and
export competition. For any member country it would also mean
replacement of the domestic rules of origin with the common rules of
the WTO with all its attendant implications for import policy
administration. The present study would make an attempt to analyze
the implications of both the above dimensions of change being
introduced by the common rules of origin from the point of view of
south Asian countries.  If the points of conflict in the harmonisation
programme were to be taken as an indication, the rules of origin pertaining
to textiles would be a major area of disagreement between developing
and developed countries. In view of the contentious nature of the rules
of origin pertaining to textiles, and the big stakes involved for South
Asia, the study would place special emphasis on textiles and
garments.
This report is organized in five Sections.  In Section 2 we discuss
economics and politics of rules of origin. In Section 3 we examine the
structure of the ARO and review the progress of the Harmonization Work
Programme (HWP).  Section 4 is devoted to a critique of the HWP,
mainly from the point of view of the South Asian Countries.  In Section
5 we put together important observations and arguments of the
study.
8Section 2
Economics and Politics of Rules of Origin
The rules of origin have never been so controversial as they have
become in recent times.  Their rise to prominence can be attributed to
three important reasons.  First, on account of growing internationalisation
of production origin determination is becoming increasingly difficult
and dispute prone. Second reason is the increasing incidence of
discriminatory trade policy tools and the consequent need to determine
the country of origin so that they can be effectively targeted. Third one
is the growing tendency to make use of the rules of origin as protectionist
tools per se, instead of using them as devices supporting more overt
trade distorting policy tools.
Internationalisation of Production and ‘Nationality’ of Origin
Internationalisation of production is making determination of
‘nationality’ of products increasingly difficult. If a product were
produced almost entirely in one country, as in the case of many primary
commodities, the nationality of origin would be quite obvious. This
perhaps was the case of most products traded internationally until a few
decades ago.  This is also the message emanating from Tables 1 and 2,
which show that even now there is large number of countries without
well-defined non-preferential rules of origin. The fact that large number
of countries did not have non-preferential rules, and that even those
countries, which had them, were having under evolved rules, suggests
that they were not widely used in trade policy praxis3 .  The fact that
origin disputes were rare in the past also strengthens the above
argument.
9Table 1: Review of Notifications on Rules of Origin (As on 15
November 2002)
Item Number of
Members
Members that have notified Non-Preferential
Rules of Origin 42
Members that have notified that they do not have
Non-Preferential Rules of Origin 41
Members that have not notified Non-Preferential
Rules of Origin 46
All Members 129
Members that have notified Preferential
Rules of Origin 84
Members that have notified that they do not have
Preferential Rules of Origin  4
Members that have not notified Preferential
Rules of Origin 42
All Members 130
Source:   WTO (2002): Eighth Annual Review of the Implementation and Operation
of the Agreement on Rules of Origin, 3 December, G/RO/55.
But, as a result of the process of internationalization of production
few products are produced now exclusively in one country. The
involvement of multinational companies also tends to complicate the
question of origin.  When ‘nationality’ of products is less obvious, there
arises the need for the rules of origin determination. It is possible,
depending on the purpose, to device different methods to determine
origin.  In fact, currently a variety of methods and their combinations
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are in vague among countries of the world.  The first attempt to evolve
a common approach for setting rules of origin was the Kyoto Customs
Convention, which laid down some common principles in 1977
(Stephenson and James 1995: 83-84).  According to the Kyoto
convention the country of origin of a product is the country where last
‘substantial transformation’ takes place.  The last substantial
transformation is defined as the one that gives the commodity its essential
character.  Indeed, such broad principles of ‘substantial transformation’
are amendable to a variety of interpretations. In order to impart clarity
and practical significance to the principle of substantial transformation,
the Kyoto convention prescribed different methods of determining
substantial transformation such as; (a) change in tariff heading (CTH) as
a result of domestic processing of imported goods in the originating
country;  (b) prescribed minimum percentage of value addition in the
originating country; and (c) occurrence of specified processing
operations in the originating country.  Each of these methods is known
to have specific advantages as well as limitations (Palmeter 1993,
Stephenson and James 1995).  The CTH method, which is considered to
be least cumbersome is too dependent on the system of trade
classification used, none of which are developed with a view to capture
the issue of transformation.  The value addition method suffers from
lack of predictability besides the obvious bias against countries with
lower wage rates.  The method of specified operations is not amenable
for making general principles and tends to vary from industry to industry.
Further, all the methods require periodic revision for adapting the origin
granting framework to changes in technology.  The methods outlined
by the Kyoto convention, however, were not binding on the members of
the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC), which administers the
convention4 .
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Table 2:  Members Notifying Nonexistence of Rules of Origin
Members that have notified that they Members that have
do not have Non-Preferential notified that they
Rules of Origin     do not have Preferential
Rules of Origin
Bolivia, Brazil , Brunei Darussalam, Burundi
Burundi, Chad , Chile, Costa Rica, Chinese Taipei
Cyprus, Dominica , Dominican Rep., Hong Kong, China
El Salvador, Fiji , Guatemala, Haiti, Macao, China
Honduras  Iceland, India, Indonesia ,
Jamaica, Kenya, Macao, China , Malaysia,
Maldives, Malta , Mauritius, Mongolia,
Namibia, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan
Panama, Papua New Guinea , Paraguay ,
 Philippines, Singapore, Suriname,
Thailand, Trinidad & Tob.
Uganda (G/RO/N/12), United Arab
Emirates (G/RO/N/17), Uruguay
(G/RO/N/12)
Source:  WTO (2002): Eighth Annual Review of the Implementation and Operation
of the Agreement on Rules of Origin, 3 December, G/RO/55.
Discriminatory Regimes and Origin Rules
The history of discriminatory policies in the post GATT period,
perhaps, is as old as 1947, when the General Agreement was signed. The
General Agreement provided for the Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
treatment among its contracting parties. Obviously, contracting parties
had to evolve some mechanism for identifying products originating
from MFN and non-MFN sources.  However, it was the Rome treaty and
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the formation of the European Economic Community in 1957 that paved
way for the emergence preferential trading arrangements (PTAs), which
had tended to proliferate in the recent past. The PTAs, by definition, are
discriminatory in nature.  They offer preferential treatment to a group of
designated partners; i.e., for members in the case of customs unions and
free trade areas, and for eligible beneficiaries in the case of non-reciprocal
arrangements such as the GSP.  In any case, functioning of PTAs requires
rules of origin to determine whether a consignment of goods is eligible
for preferential treatment or not (Hirsch 2002). Therefore, proliferation
of PTAs has necessarily been accompanied by proliferation of rules of
origin (Stephenson and James 1995).  The rules of origin are particularly
important in the context of free trade areas, which are vulnerable to the
problem of trade deflection (James 1997).  In free trade areas, unlike in
customs unions, member countries are not required to keep common
external tariff.  The existence of inter-country differences in external
tariffs in a free trade area would obviously induce trade deflection,
which is nothing but redirection of imports from third countries through
the partner country with the lowest tariff, with a view to exploit the tariff
differential between member countries.  In fact, all imports to the FTA
would tend to enter through the member country with lower external
tariff regardless of where they are finally consumed.  Such trade
deflection, if left unchecked might also ultimately force member
countries with higher external tariffs to lower their tariff levels, and
convert the FTA effectively into a customs union with the common
external tariff becoming that of the lowest tariff member of the FTA.
Therefore, FTAs practice stringent rules of origin to prevent trade
deflection.
Economic Effects of Rules of Origin
The third reason for the growing interest in the rules of origin is the
widespread tendency to make use of them as protectionist tools per se. As
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noted earlier, nation-states, as they are being deprived of the conventional
tools of protection, are increasingly resorting to the contingent forms of
protection. Almost all contingent forms of protection require well-defined
rules of origin as a complementary mechanism for determining country of
origin of products so that they are well targeted. For instance, rules of
origin are required to target measures such as countervailing duties, and
anti-dumping actions against countries or firms, which are found to be
engaging in such unfair trade practices. Rules of origin are also required
for preventing circumvention of anti-dumping and countervailing actions
through product shifting and other perceived abuses (Klieinfeld and Gaylor
1994)5 . However, preferential as well as non-preferential rules of origin
are supposed to be used as neutral tools, causing no direct or indirect trade
distorting effect on their own. But, as more recent developments indicate,
they are being widely used as trade barriers, designed specifically to
protect domestic producers (James 1997:119, Vermulst and Waer 1990). It
is to the economics of the use of rules of origin as trade policy tools per se
that we turn now.
The literature on the economic effects of rules of origin is in its
early stages of development.  This conspicuous lag in the development of
the literature can be attributed to the assumption of trade-neutrality of the
rules of origin.  The commercial policy literature has tended to approach
the rules of origin as trade-neutral tools, employed to support other policy
tools with more direct effects on the trade flows.  Naturally, the literature
focussed on the effects of trade policy tools like tariffs and quotas, which
affected trade flows rather directly. Further, the studies on preferential
rules dominate the available literature on rules of origin. An overriding
theme of this literature has been the question of consistency with the
underlying policy goals of the PTA.  In terms of welfare objectives, the
PTAs should ideally seek maximisation of net trade creating effects.  The
efficacy of the rules of origin, therefore, is judged in terms of the above
goal of trade creation.
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As stated earlier, the rules of origin are required to ensure that the
benefits of preferential tariffs are confined to the members of the PTA
and that the non-members are excluded.  In free trade areas they are also
supposed to check trade deflection (James 1997:118-9). Both these
goals are best served by making the rules of origin more stringent.  But,
there are some obvious tradeoffs. Generally speaking, stricter the origin
rules lower would be the possibility of net trade creation.  The FTAs are
supposed to generate trade-creating effects because they generate the
tendency to shift imports from inefficient home sources to efficient
member sources.  Higher the compliance cost of rules of origin, lower
will be the incidence of such trade creating impulses.  In fact, because of
the high compliance cost, efficient producers within the FTA might
even choose not to claim the privilege of preferential tariffs. In any case,
higher compliance costs would limit the FTAs ability to reach potential
levels of trade creation.  Strict regimes of rules of origin might also add
to the trade diversion effects of the FTA.  Trade diversion occurs when
preferential tariffs induce shifts in imports from efficient external
suppliers to relatively inefficient member sources.  A strict regime of
rules of origin, with stringent local content requirements, might force
the final goods producers within the PTA to source their inputs from
higher cost internal sources, thus adding to the trade diversion effects of
the PTA.  This policy of protecting the regional intermediate goods
producers might raise the cost of production of producers of final goods,
forcing them also to petition for protection.  Therefore, according to
(Hoekman 1993) such regimes of rules of origin – especially in the form
of local content requirements – could lead to cascading of protection
along the production chain.  Consumers, needless to say, would be at
the receiving end of such protectionist policies.
Incidentally, if the origin conferring system were cumulative, it
would help reduce the negative effects of the rules of origin
15
(Hoekman1993).  If the origin system were cumulative, local content or
value added required for originating status would be calculated at the
level of the PTA, and not at the level of individual member countries.  In
other words, it would make the origin system more liberal. In short, the
success of a PTA, in terms of net-trade creation and welfare, would depend
a great deal on its rules of origin6 .
In the case of non-reciprocal PTAs such as the Generalised System
of Preferences (GSP), which is meant to promote exports from developing
country beneficiaries, higher the compliance cost of rules of origin lower
would be the use of the tariff margin by the beneficiaries. Many studies
on GSP schemes have pointed out the restrictive role played by the rules
of origin (Brenton and Manchin 2002, Inama 1995). Similar criticisms
have been leveled against the EEC’s special preferential arrangements
with the African countries (Brenton and Manchin 2002)).  Recently, a
World Bank study (Mattoo, et.al. 2002) has highlighted the extremely
restrictive role of the rules of origin in the much-publicized Africa
initiative of the United States (The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act
-AGOA).  In many such affirmative preferential arrangements, the poor
countries, which are meant to be helped, find it extremely difficult to
meet the origin requirements. The AGOA, for instance, insists that apparel
be assembled in eligible African countries and that yarn and fabric be
made either in the United States or in African countries. In addition a
number of customs requirements need to satisfied to claim the US
concession.
In view of the recent developments in the literature it is important
that we add a caveat here. The traditional analyses of customs unions
based on trade creation and diversion are known to suffer from some
important limitations, including the failure to take into account the
interaction effects between final and intermediate goods markets. The
complementarities between final and intermediate goods are particularly
16
important for a discussion on the effects of rules of origin.   The overall
impact of the rules of origin would depend quite a lot on the interaction
between final and intermediate goods market (Krishna and Krueger 1995
and Ju and Krishna 1998)
To summarize the discussion so far, it is now widely recognized
that the rules of origin, more often than not, violate the trade neutrality
assumption.  This is obvious from what we have seen in the case of
PTAs.  It is possible to keep the preference margin unchanged and still
manipulate the trade flows by changing the rules of origin.  Further,
there could be situations, wherein the cost of compliance of the rules of
origin exceeds the preference margin, offsetting the tariff margin and
also thereby making the policy of preferential treatment absolutely
meaningless.  There could also be situations when preferential rules
have detrimental effects on non-members. It is widely acknowledged
that the trade diversion effects caused by preferential tariffs adversely
affect the non-members.  The rules of origin, especially in the form of
local content requirements, as we have already seen, can add to such
woes of non-members. The local content requirements might force
downstream producers in the FTA to source their inputs from higher cost
regional producers of intermediates.  Thus, for non-member producers
of intermediates the rules of origin of the FTA might act as a stiff NTB,
the tariff equivalent of which could very well be higher than the common
external tariff of the FTA.  Therefore, as Hoeckman (1993) has pointed
out, for non-members the upper bound of the tariff equivalent of an
origin rule could very well be higher than the MFN tariff of the FTA.
The rule that upper bound of a rule of origin is the MFN tariff applies
only for intra-trade flows.  Further, the tendency to use the rules of origin
as NTBs against non-member suppliers of intermediates is reported to
be becoming fairly widespread (James 1997:119).  This tendency is
reinforced by the global liberalization process under the auspices of the
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WTO, which had reduced the MFN barriers, and hence the margin of
preferences of the FTAs, old as well as new.  The European Union, for
instance, is known to have been designing very tough origin regulations
for certain strategic industries to ward off competition from non-member
producers (Vermulst and Waer 1990). The very same criticism is
applicable to NAFTA as well, the origin system of which is notoriously
protectionist, especially in the case of textiles and clothing.  The NAFTA
rules of origin in the area of textiles and clothing grant unjustifiably
high protection to the upstream producers, severely restricting market
access for external suppliers.
Non-preferential Rules of Origin
Even though our discussion on the economic effects of rules of
origin were so far on the preferential rules of origin, many insights
drawn from the same are applicable to the non-preferential rules as well.
In preferential trading arrangements, most often the rules of origin were
seen as a factor offsetting the effect of preference margin, particularly
when viewed from the point of view of members/beneficiaries.  In the
case of producers from outside the PTA the rules of origin would generally
add to the height of the barrier to the PTA market.  Same is the case of
non-preferential rules of origin; they tend to add to the trade distorting
effect of the principal trade policy tool used such as quantitative
restrictions under the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA).  The rules of origin
can be used to increase the restrictieveness of the MFA quotas. Take for
instance the hypothetical case of an African country importing fabrics
from India and making printed fabrics to be exported to the United
States. If the rules of origin in USA do not recognize making of printed
fabrics from fabrics as substantial transformation, which in any case it
does not, the African country would not be granted the origin status and
would be denied the opportunity to use its MFA quota. In fact, given
such rules of origin export of printed yarn from the African country
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might be accounted against India’s MFA quota.  Therefore, such rules of
origin can prove to be trade distorting, in more than one way.
The rules of origin designed to support measures like anti-
dumping duties, or countervailing duties, serve the objective of targeting
the designated sources of supply.  Obviously, identification of the
country of origin of a product against which an anti-dumping or a
countervailing duty is to be imposed would depend on rules of origin.
Interestingly, as rules of origin vary the country of origin of the product
and hence the country of incidence of such duties might also vary.  In
other words, even while retaining the anti-dumping duty or
countervailing duty regime without change, the rules of origin can be
manipulated to distort trade. What is significant to be underlined here is
the possibility of converting the rules of origin as trade policy tool per se.
Domestic Origin vs. Foreign Origin
Another issue related to our discussion on non-preferential rules
of origin is the criteria applied to determine whether a good is of domestic
origin or not. Can the same set of rules used to determine the foreign
country of origin of a product be applied to determine whether a product
is of domestic origin or not?  The criteria, in fact, differ in many countries.
However, the ARO insists that the rules of origin that the WTO members
apply to imports and exports should not be more stringent than the rules
of origin they apply to determine whether a good is domestic or not
(Article 1, ARO).  In other words, the rules of origin to determine whether
or not a good is of domestic origin should be either as stringent or more
stringent than the rules of origin applied to exports and imports. In any
case, origin rules applied to determine whether a product is of domestic
origin or not would have far reaching implications for commercial policy.
They could be effectively used to protect selected domestic sectors/
industries (Vermulst 1997:467-70)7 . In view of its importance, we may
illustrate the argument in some detail here.
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Suppose that US government is keen to protect domestic producers
of upstream textile products such as yarn and fabrics.  The government
can frame the rules of origin to determine the ‘domestic status’ in such a
way so that textile and clothing producers in US use yarn or fabrics
produced in US.  Textiles and clothing products produced in US using
imported yarn or fabrics could be denied ‘domestic status’ by way of
rigid origin rules with stringent domestic content requirements.  So
much so that in order to ensure the ‘domestic status’ and thereby to
avoid stiff tariff and other border measures, US producers of textile and
clothing products would source their yarn or fabric inputs from US
manufacturers rather than from lower cost external sources.
As for theoretical insights, the issue involved is quite similar to
that of domestic content requirements practiced by developing countries,
which specify requirements on the share of domestic content in
production. Failure to meet these requirements results in a penalty tariff
on inputs for domestic producers or a penalty tariff on the import of the
final good if the final good is imported. Content protection policies
have been previously analysed in the literature (Corden 1971, Krishna
and Kruger 1995). Even though, the effects of content protection are
context specific one of the most probable outcome is an increase in the
level of protection granted to the domestic input producing industry.
However, while content protection cause substitution towards domestic
inputs, it also raises the cost and hence the price of the final good.
Therefore, the content protection schemes might not be very attractive
from the point of view of the domestic final good industry8 .
The established trend earlier in the world of commercial policy,
especially in developed countries was to give more protection to final
goods by way of escalation of trade barriers across processing chains.
The escalation of tariffs across processing chains, and the consequent
high level of effective protection granted to the final goods producers
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by the developed countries continues to be a major source of worry for
developing country exporters. However, in some sectors like textiles
and clothing the developed countries are now keen to protect the
upstream activities. The rules of origin are potential trade policy weapons
in pursuing the goal of protecting the producers of intermediate goods.
Generally a country, which wants to protect intermediate good producing
industry, would prefer stringent rules of origin for the final good, tracing
its origin to the country of production of the intermediate good. Whereas,
a country, which do not produce the intermediate good, whose final
goods industry is dependent on imports, is likely to favour more liberal
rules of origin for the final good, and unlikely to support provisions
tracing the origin of the final good to the intermediate good producing
country.
‘Privatisation’ of Trade Policy
Another important feature of protectionism based on rules of origin
is the so-called “privatisation” of trade policy.  Individual industries,
and concerned industrial lobbies play a very important role in
determining the level of protection granted in the case of most of the
new, contingent forms of protection, including rules of origin.  In these
cases, whether protection is finally granted or not, and the level of
protection would depend largely on the persuasive skills and strengths
of the industrial lobbies.  The cumbersome administrative process
involved, and the scope of involvement by the import competing
interests, makes the system less predictable as well as less transparent
when compared to the overt methods of protection (Palmeter 1993,
Hoekman 1993).  Contextually, U.S textile lobbies are known to
have played an important role in framing highly restrictive US and
NAFTA rules of origin in the area of textiles and clothing (Hoekman
1993).
21
Section 3
The WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin
The WTO agreement on rules of origin was adopted at Marrakesh
as part of the final results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (MTN).  As can be seen from Chart 1 the ARO is divided
into four Parts, containing nine Articles, and two Annexes.  Part I (Article
1) presents definitions and coverage, which excludes the preferential
rules of origin from the scope of the harmonisation work programme.
Part II deals with disciplines to govern the application of rules of origin
during the transition period (Article 2) and disciplines after the transition
period (Article 3).  Part III, which contains Articles 4 to 8 presents the
proposed procedural arrangements on notification, review, consultation
and dispute settlement.  Article 4, which deal specifically with the
institutional structure, deserve special mention.  It provides for the
establishment of the Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO) and the
Technical Committee on Rules of Origin (TCRO).  The CRO, composed
of representatives from each of the members, is supposed to be the key
organizational arm of the ARO in implementing its objectives.  The
TCRO established under the auspices of the WCO is supposed help the
CRO by providing it with technical inputs.  Part IV (Article 9) is devoted
exclusively to the harmonisation work programme.  Annex I of the ARO
is on TCRO and provides details on the technical work, which are not,
mentioned in part III of the agreement.  Annex II is a common declaration
with regard to preferential rules of origin to which the mainstream articles
of the ARO do not apply.
22
As a broad principle the ARO (Article 9) maintains that the country
to be determined as the origin of a particular good should be either the
country where the good has been wholly obtained or, when more than
one country is involved, the country where last substantial transformation
of non-originating materials has been carried out. This is perfectly in
agreement with the recommendations of the Kyoto Convention.  An
important initial task to be undertaken by the TCRO is to develop a
harmonised definition of the goods that are to be considered as wholly
obtained in one country.  In such cases, as we have seen earlier, the
‘nationality’ of origin will be fairly obvious.  However, to support the
harmonised definition of goods wholly obtained in one country, the
TCRO is also entrusted to evolve a harmonised definition of minimal
operations or processes that do not themselves confer origin to a good.
Chart 1: Structure of ARO
Part I:  Definitions and Coverage
                Article 1 – Rules of Origin
Part II: Disciplines to Govern the Application of Rules of Origin
Article 2 - Discipline during the Transition Period
Article 3 - Disciplines after the Transition Period
     Part III:Procedural Arrangements on Notification, Review,
Consultations and Dispute Settlement
Article 4 - Institutions
Article 5 - Procedures for Introduction of New RO
Article 6 - Review
Article 7 - Consultation
Article 8 - Dispute Settlement
     Part IV: Harmonisation of Rules of Origin
Article 9 - Objectives & Principles
     Annex I:
Technical Committee on Rules of Origin
     Annex II:
Common Declaration on Preferential Rules of Origin
23
When more than one country is involved in the production of a
good the consideration of substantial transformation is prescribed to be
evoked.  The general principle for determining substantial transformation
prescribed is that of Change in Tariff Heading (CTH) in the Harmonised
System (HS) nomenclature.  The TCRO is entrusted with the job of
suggesting minimum change within the nomenclature that meets the
criterion of substantial transformation on a product-by-product basis.
However, as we have already indicated the HS nomenclature is not
developed on the basis of the criterion of substantial transformation.  As
such, the CTH method may not be the appropriate rule in the case of all
products to judge whether there has been substantial transformation.
Therefore, the TCRO is entrusted to suggest supplementary criteria in
the case of products where the exclusive use of HS nomenclature does
not allow for the expression of substantial transformation.  The
supplementary methods suggested are the advalorem criterion and the
method of prescribing manufacturing or processing operations.9
The TCRO is expected to complete the above tasks in a phased
manner taking into account the chapters and sections of the H.S
nomenclature and submit the results to the CRO on a quarterly basis.  It
is up to the CRO to consider the interpretations of the TCRO before
endorsing them.  After completing the technical work outlined above,
the CRO would consider the question of overall coherence of the draft
rules of origin formulated at the level of individual products.  Finally,
the authority to adopt the harmonisation work programme and to make
it an integral part of the ARO is that of the Ministerial Conference.
Review of the Harmonisation Work Programme
Harmonisation of the rules of origin is one of the most ambitious,
and perhaps the most technically oriented tasks that the WTO had
undertaken since its inception in 1995.  The CRO and the TCRO, the
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two committees entrusted with the job, in fact, have made commendable
progress in fulfilling their respective responsibilities.  However, in spite
of several years of intense negotiation and massive amount of work that
had gone in, the task of harmonisation remains far from complete.  The
HWP was supposed to be over in July 1998, after three years of it’s
launching in July 1995.  The deadline was extended several times by
the General Council, but the extended deadlines were passed without
the completion of the HWP.  The General Council at its meeting in
December 2002, extended the deadline for the completion of
negotiations on the 94 core policy issues until July 2003.  The General
Council also agreed that the CRO, following resolution of the core
policy issues, should complete its remaining technical work by the end
of 2003 (WTO 2003:G/L/593/Add.1).
An important achievement of the HWP so far has been the
Integrated Negotiating Text, which lay down the overall architecture of
the harmonised non-preferential rules of origin.  The Integrated
Negotiating Text, which was subjected to several rounds of revision,
has dealt with goods that are to be considered as being wholly obtained
in one country, minimal operations, substantial transformation through
change in tariff classification and/or supplementary criteria.  The
Integrated Negotiating Text contains, besides the general rules, two
appendices; first one on harmonised rules pertaining to wholly obtained
goods, and the second one dealing with product specific rules of origin.
Except for two important outstanding issues, there is broad
consensus among members regarding harmonised definitions of the
goods, which are to be considered wholly, obtained in one country.
Appendix 1(WTO 2002:G/RO/45/Rev.2) presents an exhaustive list of
goods that are to be considered as being wholly obtained in one country
such as:
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(a) Live animals born and raised in that country;
(b) Animals obtained by hunting, trapping, fishing, gathering or
capturing in that country;
(c) Products obtained from live animals in that country
(d) Plants and plant products harvested, picked or gathered in that
country
(e) Minerals and other naturally occurring substances extracted or
taken in that country
(f) Scrap and waste derived from manufacturing or processing
operations or from consumption in that country and fit only for
disposal or for the recovery of raw materials.
(g) Articles collected in that country which can no longer perform
their original purpose there nor are capable of being restored or
repaired and which are fit only for disposal or for the recovery of
parts of raw materials.
(h) Parts or raw materials recovered in that country from articles
which can no longer perform their original purpose nor are capable
of being restored or repaired
(i) Goods obtained or produced in that country solely from products
referred to in (a) through (h) above.
When we add the definition of minimal operation and process
(Rule 2), to the above list of wholly obtained goods we get a fairly
comprehensive harmonised definition of the wholly obtained goods.
Minimal operations and process are defined as follows.
“ Operations or processes undertaken, by themselves, or in
combination with each other, for the purposes listed below, are
considered to be minimal and shall not be taken into account in
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determining whether a good has been wholly obtained in one country:
(1) ensuring preservation of goods in good condition for the purposes of
transport and storage; (2) facilitating shipment or transportation; (3)
packaging or presenting goods for sale” (WTO 2002:G/RO/45/Rev. 2).
However, there is no consensus on the issue of origin of recovered
parts from collected articles (which can no longer perform their original
purpose – e.g. discarded computers).  The two options are to confer
origin either to the country where the articles are collected, or to the
country where the parts are extracted.  But, the above rules were not
acceptable to some members because recovery of parts from collected
articles might also release radioactive, hazardous and toxic waste, the
disposal of which could emerge as a major environmental problem.
Another problem that eludes consensus is the question of origin of fish
and other products taken from the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
There is agreement among members that the origin of fish and other
products taken from the territorial sea (not exceeding 12 nautical miles)
of a country should be the coastal state.  It is also being agreed upon that
the origin of fish and other products taken from the high seas should be
the country whose flag the vessel that carries out these operations is
entitled to fly.  However, disagreement persists in the case of fish and
other products taken from the exclusive economic zone  (EEZ) (WTO
2002:G/RO/52).  While countries like India maintain that the origin of
fish and other products taken from EEZ should be the coastal state,
USA, EEC, Japan, Canada, and some other countries insist that the origin
should go to the country of the flag of the vessel (WTO 2002:G/RO/52).
The interest of the latter group of countries is to have an international
fishing area as large as possible with origin of the products determined
by the flag of the ship, whereas the former group want to keep full
control over the resources of their waters (Nell 1999).
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Product Specific Rules of Origin
Most of the road-blocs to the HWP are to be seen in the attempt to
evolve product specific rules of origin, which put forward specific criteria
for substantial transformation.  In June 1999, when TCRO submitted the
final results of its technical work in this regard, there were 486
outstanding product specific issues to be considered by CRO.  The CRO
could resolve many of them after that.  However, since the rest of the
outstanding issues were difficult to be dealt with at the committee level,
the CRO had referred them to the General Council for discussion and
decision.  Out of 94-core policy issues referred to the General Council
92 were related to the product specific rules.  Among the two other
issues referred to the General Council, one was the question of origin of
fish and other products taken from the EEZ.  The other was the
implication of the implementation of the Harmonised Rules of Origin
for other WTO agreements. The agreement on rules of origin would
have implications for almost all other WTO agreements. Over the past
several years the CRO had held intensive discussions on the issue and
decided to submit the same to the General Council along with the
Chairman’s proposals.
Regarding the outstanding product specific issues, it is difficult
to make generalization on the nature of disputes and the position taken
by the members. Indeed, what will or will not qualify for substantial
transformation is the central question of conflict almost in every case.
But a perusal of the positions taken by members across product groups
brings out lack of consistency in their approach to the question of
substantial transformation. Information presented in Table 3 would help
us illustrate the conflicting positions taken by countries.  For instance,
the US, which insists on stringent norms in the area of textiles and
textile articles, is rather reluctant to accept such a rigid approach in the
case of many tropical products. India’s position in the cases cited above
28
is exactly the opposite of those of the US. India, which opposes harsh
norms in the area of textile and textile articles, is all for stricter norms for
tropical products. Such inconsistency in approach by which countries
refuse to follow general norms and broad principles in a consistent
manner is widely noted among the WTO membership.  There is no
dearth of examples for illustrating such inconsistencies in the position
of members.
Table 3:  Conflicts over Defining Substantial Transformation: An
Illustration
Process India USA
Green Coffee is processed It is not substantial  It is substantial
through roasting into  transformation  transformation
roasted coffee
Cocoa beans transformed It is not substantial It is substantial
into cocoa paste by roasting,  transformation  transformation
winnowing, alkalization and
grinding
Fruits or vegetables are It is not substantial It is substantial
processed through extraction transformation  transformation
into juices
Crushing/grinding of spices It is not substantial It is substantial
transformation transformation
Making dyed or printed It is substantial It is not substantial
yarn from yarn transformation transformation
Making dyed or printed It is substantial It is not substantial
fabrics from fabrics transformation transformation
Source:  WTO (2002): Report by the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of
Origin  to the General  Council, G/RO/52, 15 July.
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The reasons behind such inconsistencies in the position of
countries are not far to seek.  The most important among them is the
influence of trading interests.  Negotiating positions of countries across
product sectors are determined by the corresponding national trading
interests rather than by any common principle to be adopted in a uniform
manner.
The question as to whether the outstanding issues would be solved
and whether, therefore, HWP would be concluded before the latest
deadline set for the purpose (end of 2003) defy easy answers.  The
remaining outstanding issues represent hard fought and long held
positions of member countries involving big stakes.  As such they are
unlikely to be resolved at the level of TCRO or CRO.  An early resolution
of the outstanding issues might, therefore, require involvement of the
General Council or even the Ministerial Conference.  In any case, a
comprehensive evaluation of the outcome of the HWP will have to wait
until the outstanding issues are resolved and the HWP completed.
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Section 4
Harmonisation Work Programme: A Critique
Obviously, it is now premature to attempt a comprehensive critique
of the unfinished HWP. Such a study should probably wait till the
Ministerial Conference finally adopts the harmonised rules of origin.
However, the progress made so far, as outlined in the previous section,
prompts a critical analysis of the HWP, which is undertaken here primarily
from the point of view of the South Asian countries.
In Section II we have identified factors that tend to make the
hitherto inconsequential rules of origin a contested terrain.  None of the
factors identified, viz., internationalisation of production, increasing
incidence of discriminatory trade policy tools that require well defined
rules to determine nationality of origin of commodities, and the growing
tendency to make use of rules of origin as protectionist tools per se are
likely to decline in importance in the foreseeable future.  On the contrary,
each of them are likely to grow in importance over time making the
rules of origin sites of growing trade policy conflicts among nations.
The ARO, therefore, has come none too early. It is important that the
ARO succeed in its fundamental goal of establishing a multilateral regime
for rules of origin, lest the anarchy that is likely to break out in the
sphere of rules of origin would endanger the process of trade
liberalization. It is advisable; therefore, that a critique of the ARO address
the question as to whether such a regime would be established and also
whether the tendency to use rules of origin as discriminatory policy
tools per se would be checked. A related and perhaps equally important
question would be that of the nature of the multilateral regime on rules
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of origin that is in the making. It is one thing to establish an international
regime and quite another to ensure that it is non-discriminatory in nature.
The latter question is particularly important when seen from the point of
view of developing countries, such as those in South Asia, which lack
political and economic clout to influence the outcome of international
trade negotiations.
In our opinion the ARO and the HWP are likely to fall short of
expectations with respect to both the objectives outlined above.  In
spite of the multilateral regime visualized by the ARO, the rules of
origin are likely to be misused widely for protectionist proposes.  Further,
as our analysis show, the regime that is in the making is likely to be
biased against the interests of the developing countries including those
of South Asia.
The central limitation of the ARO and the HWP we wish to
highlight here is their inability in addressing the most important issue
that they were suppose to address, viz., the tendency to use rules of
origin as discriminatory trade policy tools per se.  Take first the case of
discrimination among foreign suppliers.  The most important source of
such discrimination in today’s world, undoubtedly, is the preferential
trading arrangements (PTAs).  But, as we have already seen the
preferential rules of origin are not in the purview of the HWP. The Annex
II of the ARO, which presents the common declaration with regard to
preferential rules of origin, can hardly compensate for the exclusion of
the preferential rules from the HWP. The misuse of rules of origin, as a
protectionist tool is quite rampant among the PTAs.  In fact, as we have
argued at length earlier, it was the proliferation of PTAs that had led to
the proliferation of rules of origin.  It is quite common for individual
countries to join several PTAs, representing a hierarchy of privileges
and preferences. All these, it is widely argued, contribute to the
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uncertainties and risk of traders.  It is no exaggeration to say that
originating status would vary not only according to destination of
exports but also depending on the preferential regime that the exporters
choose to avail
The excuse for the exclusion of preferential rules of origin could
be that they affect only the members/beneficiaries of the PTA.  But, as
we have already seen in Section II, rules of origin of PTAs could act as
stiff non-tariff barriers against non-members. The PTAs can employ rules
of origin, as many of them do, to scale up barriers to imports from non-
members.  This, it needs to be underlined is against the spirit of the
article XXIV of GATT, which permits establishment of PTAs. The purpose
of such preferential agreements, as article XXIV makes clear, “should be
to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise
barriers to the trade of other members”. As such, if the declared objective
of the WTO of eliminating trade distorting effects of rules of origin is to
be achieved, it should be addressing the question of preferential rules, if
not now, in the near future.  The developing countries should perhaps
insist first on documenting all preferential rules of origin and then on
periodic negotiations for making them less stringent.
Coming more specifically to the impact on South-Asian countries,
the exclusion of preferential rules from the harmonisation programme
would not be very advantageous in improving their market access to the
PTAs among developed countries.  The PTAs such as EEC, EFTA and
NAFTA will continue to misuse rules of origin to protect domestic
production as they do now.  The phasing out of overt trade barriers
might also lead to more extensive use of rules of origin as trade policy
tools in such PTAs.  But, the exclusion of preferential rules from the
HWP would enable the South Asian countries also to make preferential
rules of their choice in the PTAs that they establish.  This is particularly
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important because the PTAs involving South Asian countries are of
relatively new origin.  Since new PTAs are likely to be characterised by
relatively high inter-country differences in tariffs, they are likely to be
more vulnerable to trade diversion (Panchmukhi and Das 2002). However,
it is advisable that the PTAs among the developing countries also desist
the temptation to revise the rules of origin periodically to make them
more stringent.
Another reason for our pessimistic note on the proposed
international regime on rules of origin is the inbuilt need for periodic
revision of rules of origin and the scope that it entails for ‘privatization’
of trade policy making. This criticism is applicable to, both preferential
and non-preferential rules of origin. Internationalisation of production
and accompanying technological changes would require periodic
revision of the rules of origin, especially in product groups where
technologies and production processes change fast.  Such periodic
revision will be all the more important in the case of products, rules of
origin of which are defined in terms of specific processes.  The process
of technological change also presupposes periodic revision of the tariff
nomenclature.  The harmonised rules of origin are supposed to be based
on the Harmonized System of trade classification. The HS is subject to
periodic revision so that it is sensitive to changes in technology and
structural transformation of trade.  The changes in the HS nomenclature,
therefore, will be another reason for undertaking periodic revision of
the rules of origin.  Interestingly, therefore, the HWP and the conflicts
that it entails are likely to be a permanent feature of the WTO in the
future.  The need for periodic revision and the consequent uncertainty
regarding the rules of origin might strengthen the tendency of
‘privatisation’ of trade policy. It would also add to the burden of
negotiators from developing countries, including South Asian nations.
As (Satapathy 1998a) pointed out the HWP has turned out to be a costly
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affair, as it has also been long drawn out, not only for the world body but
also for the member countries. Even though Article 6 of the ARO provides
for the introduction of amendments to the harmonised rules, procedures
for the same are yet to be evolved. In view of the threat of misuse and
‘privatisation’, it is important that detailed procedures for moving the
amendments are clearly laid out.
It is contextual here to mention the increasing incidence of
violation of transition disciplines spelt out in Article 2 of the ARO.
Given the long drawn out nature of the negotiations it is difficult to
predict as to when the harmonised rules would be getting implemented.
Till then the transition disciplines assumes special importance.  In the
transition period members are not expected to introduce new rules of
origin, or changes in the existing regimes, which are likely to be used as
instruments to pursue trade objectives directly or indirectly.  However,
instances of violation of such interim disciplines are increasing.  An
instance worth special mention here has been the changes introduced
by the United States of America to its rules of origin for textile and
apparel products, which entered into force on 1 July 1996.  The US
action, highly protectionist as it has been, had given rise to demand for
consultation from the part of many members including India and the
EEC (WTO 2002:G/RO/D/4).  Incidentally, the issue taken later to the
dispute settlement body by India was settled in favour of the US (Pratap
2003). Further delay of the HWP is likely to lead to such rules of origin
based protectionist moves from member states.  There is, therefore, a
clear case for negotiating an understanding to keep status quo (A stand
still understanding) in the case of rules of origin till the HWP is
completed.
Regarding the second proposition, there are many reasons why
we fear that the new multinational regime would be biased against the
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interests of developing countries.  We have already mentioned two of
them, viz., exclusion of preferential rules of origin, and the threat of
periodic revision of rules of origin that leaves scope for the so called
‘privatization’ of trade policy making.  Both these factors, given the
size and strength of PTAs among developed countries, and the bargaining
power of industrial lobbies from the west, are likely to have adverse
implications for developing countries. Coming to more substantial
reasons, since the non-preferential rules of origin under the HWP are
supposed to be common to all WTO members, the scope of discrimination
would appear to be limited.  But, as we shall try to illustrate, the proposed
regime of common rules of origin is no guarantee for equal treatment.
Before explaining as to how the common rules can be
discriminatory, it is important to note that the new regime deny special
and differential treatment to the developing countries. Individual
developing countries will not have the right to make deviation from the
common rules to suit their stage of development.  Interestingly, this is in
contrast to most other agreements of WTO, which are known to factor-in
the question of development into their framework. In our opinion,
developing countries have a case for demanding the right to deviate
from common rules of origin, wherever such concessions are justifiable
in terms of special and differential treatment.
Coming back to the question of discrimination, it should be
emphasized that while harmonised rules are common for individual
product groups across countries, they differ significantly between product
groups.  In some product groups, the common rules are very simple
while in some others very stringent.  This difference across product
groups arises out of varying perceptions regarding what will or will not
qualify for substantial transformation. As we have already seen there are
no universal rules or commonly accepted criteria for determining
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substantial transformation. The criteria proposed by the TCRO and the
CRO vary significantly across products.  As such general discussions on
common criteria of substantial transformation would not throw much
light on the question of regional impact. In fact, a clear idea on the
regional impact would require product specific studies to be undertaken
with respect to all important commodity groups of the region.  In the
present study, our focus, considering their overwhelming significance
to the region, is on textiles and clothing products.
An illustration in terms of textiles and clothing is particularly
important in the context of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.
The ten-year period over which the MFA quotas are supposed to be
phased out is ending on December 31, 2004.  The consequent
rehabilitation of the textiles and clothing sector to the GATT fold from
1 January 2005, when all bilateral quotas vanish, is expected to usher in
a new era of free trade and expanding markets.  The South Asian countries
are also expected to make significant gains from the MFA phase out
(Wijayasiri 2003).
But, the initial euphoria is fading as we move closer to January 1,
2005.  It is now clear that in the post integration phase the developed
countries would be resorting to the tariffs in a big way to protect their
textiles and clothing producers (Bagchi 1998).  It is also becoming
obvious that the developed countries would be resorting to a variety of
covert protectionist tools, such as anti-dumping and countervailing
duties (Bagchi, 1998, Wijayasiri 2003) to ward off competition from the
third world.  What is more significant in our context is the likelihood of
rules of origin emerging as a highly potent protectionist weapon.  We
have already seen indications of the same in NAFTA as well as in section
334 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 1996 of the United States.
The U.S move, supported by the developed countries, is to influence the
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HWP so that the home spun and highly protectionist rules of origin are
imposed on the community of nations.
 Free trade owes many of its virtues to specialization.  But, an
important feature of the U.S proposals on rules of origin in textiles and
clothing, which we highlight here, is their anti-specialization bias.  Over
many centuries textiles and clothing industries had evolved quite an
intricate pattern of international specialization.  There are countries and
regions, which specialize in one or many combinations of activities
such as spinning, weaving, bleaching, texturing, dyeing, printing,
coating, impregnating, embroidery, making of made up articles, assembly
of garments, etc.  There are countries, which do not produce any yarn or
fabric but maintain a strong presence in the industry and trade by virtue
of their comparative advantage and specialization in other activities.
But, if developed country proposals are accepted, many such activities/
avenues of specialization will not by themselves meet the criteria of
substantial transformation/origin status.  The situation would be so bad
that the origin of yarn and fabrics, regardless of dyeing, printing and so
many other processing operations  done elsewhere would be traced
back to the country of spinning or weaving.  A brief account of some
origin disputes presented in Table 4 would make the competing positions
clear.  Keeping in tune with the history of evolution of the industry, and
its present international structure, India and other developing countries
in general recognize each such activity/avenue of specialization as
substantial transformation requiring shift of origin.  Whereas, the
developed countries, led by the U.S, refuse to recognize many key
processes/avenues of specialization as substantial to cause shift in origin.
For them, origin of textiles and clothing products should be traced
back, as far as possible, to the country of origin of yarn or fabric.
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Table 4:  Selected Origin Disputes in Textiles and Clothing
Process India U.S
Dyeing or printing Permanent dyeing or A yarn of one country
 of yarn printing alone can be that is dyed and/or
considered as substan- printed in another
tial transformation country should not be
considered as
originating in the latter
country
Dyeing or Printing Permanent dyeing or Neither dyeing nor
of fabrics printing alone can be printing alone nor
considered as dyeing and printing
substantial together result in
transformation substantial
transformation
Coating fabrics with Coating of rubber or Coating of fabrics with
 rubber or plastics plastics can be rubber or plastics
considered as cannot be considered
substantial as origin conferring
transformation
Making embroidered Substantial Country of origin shall
flat products transformation if the be the same as the
from fabric value of non- country of origin of
originating materials fabric
does not exceed 50
per cent of the ex-work
price of the product
Parts knitted or Considers as Not considering as
 crocheted to shape substantial substantial
 are processed transformation transformation
 through assembling
 into apparel
Source:   WTO (2002) Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of
Origin to the General Council, G/RO/52, 15 July
39
If U.S proposals of non-preferential rules were accepted it would
give a discriminatory advantage to the domestic producers vis-à-vis
foreign sources of yarn and fabrics.  Take for instance the case of U.S
manufacturers of printed fabrics.  If they import fabrics for printing from
India they could be denied the domestic status.  Their products could be
treated as of foreign origin and made liable to pay the customs duty.  As
such, regardless of the price advantage of the Indian source, the US firms
might source their inputs from within the country.
The implications of such a regime would be highly trade distorting
if the MFA survives in the present form or in new avtars.  The export of
textile articles from other developing countries, which source yarn or
fabrics from India or Pakistan would be counted against the bilateral
quotas of India and Pakistan! The new rules might also make
administration of trade more cumbersome and costly.  A related problem
is that of targeting trade policy tools such as anti-dumping and
countervailing duties. Suppose anti-dumping action is to be taken
against a country ‘A’ exporting printed fabrics and made-up articles
using fabrics imported from another country ‘B’.  According to the U.S
proposals the anti-dumping and countervailing duties would be charged
on the country of origin which would be ‘B’ not ‘A’.  Further, in the case
of many products of textiles and clothing it will be difficult to trace the
country of origin of yarn or fabrics used in their making.  In fact, the
country of origin of a product produced by a given firm might go on
changing according to the changes in the source of inputs. Accordingly,
the manufacturer will also be forced to change the marking of origin.
Last but not the least is the bias against specialisation: countries
specialising in processing operations such as dyeing, printing, etc. will
be denied originating status.  In the process it would also make protection
of intellectual property rights related to the processing activities (eg.
IPRs on designs) difficult.  Such countries, which are denied originating
status, might also fail to attract investment.
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Admittedly, the impact of common rules would vary significantly
across South Asian countries. Upstream protection in developed
countries would tend to affect India and Pakistan more than other
countries in the region. That big stakes are involved for both India and
Pakistan is clear from data presented in Table 5 & 6 (See also Spinanger
and Verma, 2003).  As relative share of countries in world exports show
India and Pakistan are leading exporters of yarn and textile products.
Further, yarn and textile products are leading items in the export baskets
of India and Pakistan. Smaller countries in the region, however, do not
export much yarn or fabrics. But, the fact that they specialize in
downstream products is no consolation for countries like Bangladesh or
Sri Lanka. Some of the processes in which they specialize might not be
origin conferring. Therefore, if US proposals are accepted they will also
be under pressure to make many adjustments to cope up with the new
rules.
Obviously, in textiles and clothing India prefers more liberal rules
of origin than those proposed by the developed countries. But, this does
not mean that it would be in the interest of India to demand relatively
liberal rules of origin across all product groups. There are many product
groups in which India and for that matter other South Asian countries
prefer stricter rules of origin than those proposed by developed countries.
For instance, as we have illustrated in Table 3, India, which opposes
harsh norms in the area of textiles and textile articles, is all for stricter
norms for tropical products. In the case of most tropical products and
their derivatives, India prefers to have rules, which trace the origin to
the country in which the plant grew. Whereas, for developed countries,
even such minor processing activities such as crushing or grinding of
spices is origin conferring!
41
Table 5: South Asia in World Trade of Yarn and Textile Products
Product Code Country Share of the Share of the
 Product in the  Country in the
Country’s  Total World
Total  Exports  Exports of the
 Commodity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Textile Yarn (651) India 4.41 4.91
Pakistan 13.23 3.54
Sri Lanka NI NI
Bangladesh NI NI
Cotton Fabrics, India 2.78 4.93
Woven(652) Pakistan 14.09 6.01
Sri Lanka NI NI
Bangladesh NI NI
Woven Man-made Fib India 1.09 1.32
Fabric (653) Pakistan 5.8 1.69
Sri Lanka NI NI
Bangladesh NI NI
Knitted, ETC, India NI NI
Fabric (655) Pakistan 0.93 0.61
Sri Lanka NI NI
Bangladesh NI NI
Spec Textile Fabrics, India 0.25 0.44
Products (657) Pakistan NI NI
Sri Lanka NI NI
Bangladesh NI NI
Textile Articles India 2.41 5.55
NES (658) Pakistan 13.68 7.55
Sri Lanka NI NI
Bangladesh 2.96 0.87
Notes:  NI stands for not included. NI for Column 3 means that the product
concerned is not among top 10 export products (at SITC 3-digit level) of
the country concerned.  NI for column 4 means that the country is not
among top ten exporters of the commodity.
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2001
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Table 6: South Asia in World Trade of Clothing Products
Product Code Country Share of the Share of the
 Product in the  Country in the
Country’s  Total World
Total  Exports  Exports of the
 Commodity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men’s Outwear India NI NI
Non-knit (842) Pakistan 4.09 1.09
Sri Lanka 7.52 1.1
Bangladesh 23.61 3.37
Women’s Outwear India 5.33 4.45
Non-knit (843) Pakistan NI NI
Sri Lanka 17.85 1.96
Bangladesh 13.04 1.4
Under Garments India 2.39 6.04
Non-knit (844) Pakistan NI NI
Sri Lanka 5.26 1.75
Bangladesh 18.97 6.17
Outer Garments Knit India NI NI
Nonelastic (845) Pakistan 2.98 0.62
Sri Lanka 7.22 0.82
Bangladesh 10.14 1.12
Under Garments India 2.57 3.03
Knitted (846) Pakistan 5.65 1.6
Sri Lanka 9.4 1.46
Bangladesh 8.96 1.36
Headgear, Non-Textile India 1.2 3.76
Clothing (848) Pakistan 4.9 3.67
Sri Lanka 2.12 0.87
Bangladesh NI NI
Notes:   NI stands for not included. NI for Column 3 means that the product
concerned is not among top 10 export products (at SITC 3-digit level) of
the country concerned.  NI for column 4 means that the country is not
among top ten exporters of the commodity.
Source:  UNCTAD Handbook  of Statistics, 2001
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Even though, tropical products are produced mostly in developing
countries they end up specializing mainly in the lower stages of the
processing /value chain.  This pattern of specialisation is explained
mainly in terms of escalation of tariff and other barriers across processing
chains in developed country markets. Interestingly, the liberal rules of
origin proposed by the developed countries in the area tropical products
would tend to reinforce the above legacy of specialisation. Therefore,
the developing countries have sound reasons for demanding stricter
rules of origin for tropical products. Further, their argument that the
country where the plant grew, which determine many an essential
attribute of the tropical products and their derivatives, should be
recognised has implications for possible geographical indications in
such products. This assumes special significance in the context of the
demand that the additional protection conferred for geographical
indications for wines and spirits be extended to other products,
particularly those of interest to the developing countries. Interestingly,
the EEC has been stubborn in the negotiations that the origin of wine,
whether produced from grapes or grape must, shall be the country in
which the grapes grew (WTO, 2002: G/RO/52).
It is clear that commercial policy objectives of countries, and
therefore, their preferences regarding rules of origin would vary across
product groups. Therefore, for studies on the implications of the new
regime there are no short cuts other than detailed product specific studies
of alternative proposals of rules of origin. Nevertheless, a perusal of
positions taken by countries in the harmonisation negotiations prompts
us to reiterate the observations made in section II. Mostly, countries,
when they want to protect intermediate good producing industry, prefer
stringent rules of origin for the final good, tracing the origin to the
country of production of the intermediate goods. Whereas, if the final
good industry is dependent on import of intermediates, particularly
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when import competing production of intermediates is absent, they
favour more liberal rules of origin for the final good, and do not support
provisions tracing the origin of final goods to the intermediate good
producing country. But, obviously, common rules would mean that all
countries couldn’t have rules of origin of their choice. The choice among
alternative proposals, especially in the absence of theoretically informed
norms, will depend much on the balance of political and economic
power of contending parties.  The question, therefore, boils down to the
ability of individual nations, or their groups such as that of developing
countries, to influence the process of rule setting. Interestingly, the
picture emerging from our analysis of outstanding issues is not very
encouraging for the developing nations.
Regarding the harmonised definition of wholly obtained goods,
it is important that we mention the issue of control of maritime resources,
which is of overwhelming significance to South Asia.  Among countries
in South Asia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh posses long
coastlines.  As such it is in their interest to keep full control over the
resources of their waters.  India’s position in this regard that the origin of
fish and other products taken from the exclusive economic zone should
be the coastal state represents an interest, which the countries of the
region can hardly compromise.
Interestingly, most of the outstanding product specific issues, as
shown in Table 7, are of export interest to developing countries, including
those of the South Asian region. Agricultural products (45) and Textiles
and Textile Articles (24) together account for 69 out of the 92 product
specific issues transferred to the General Council by the CRO.  Even
other areas, listed as disputed are also of export interest to developing
countries. It cannot be dismissed as an instance of sheer coincidence
that the lion’s share of the outstanding issues belongs to the traditional
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Table 7:  Product Specific Rules: Distribution of Outstanding Issues
   No. of
H.S Chapters Description          Outstanding
     Issues
1- 24 Live Animals, Animal Products, 45 (49)
Vegetable Products, Animal or
Vegetable Fats, Oils, Prepared
Food Stuffs, Beverages, etc.
25-27 Mineral Products 2 (2)
28-40 Chemicals and Plastics 3 (3)
41-43 Raw Hides, Skins, Leather, Travel 2 (2)
Goods, etc.
50-63 Textiles and Textile Articles 24 (26)
64-67 Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas, etc. 4 (4)
72-74 Iron and Steel, Copper and 2 (2)
Articles thereof
84, 85, 90 Machinery and Electrical Appliances, 9 (10)
Optical Instruments, etc.
91 Clocks and Watches and Parts thereof 1 (1)
All Chapters 92  (100)
Source:  WTO (2002) Report by the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of
Origin to the General Council, G/RO/52, 15 July.
areas of western protectionism.  It may also be underlined that agriculture,
textiles and textile articles, which account for 75 per cent of the
outstanding issues were outside the GATT disciplines until recently.  As
a result of the Marrakesh agreement both agriculture and textiles are
being brought back to the purview of free trade disciplines.  As such
developed countries are required to phase out overt trade barriers in
those areas of world trade.  There is also a widely held fear that the
developed countries would be trying to compensate for the loss of such
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overt measures by resorting to the contingent forms of protection.  Even
though it is too early to say whether such bunching of outstanding
disputes signify a reemergence old agricultural and textile protectionism,
such fears cannot be completely ruled out.
Conclusion
From neutral trade policy devices employed to identity country
of origin of commodities, the rules of origin are emerging as protectionist
tools.  Ironically, it is the success of the ideology of free trade, and the
gradual elimination of overt trade barriers such as tariffs that made such
covert trade barriers including rules of origin so popular among policy
makers.  Nation-states, as they are increasingly denied of conventional
trade policy tools, are reasserting themselves by evolving new and less
visible weapons of intervention. The misuse of rules of origin as
protectionist tools is widely reported from PTAs among developed
countries, such as EEC and NAFTA.  More recently, non-preferential
rules of origin are also being used for protectionist purpose.  It is such
protectionist adaptation of the rules of origin that prompted the WTO to
launch the HWP to evolve common rules of origin for all countries.
The central objective of the ARO and also the HWP is to ensure
that the rules of origin are employed without/ or with least trade distorting
effects.  But, as our study shows, it would be too optimistic to expect
such an outcome from the HWP. On the contrary, even if it is successfully
completed, the HWP is likely to leave considerable scope for misuse of
rules of origin for protectionist purpose.  We say so for the following
reasons. First, none of the factors identified, viz., internationalization of
production, increasing incidence of discriminatory trade policy tools,
and the growing tendency to make use of rules of origin as protectionist
tools per se, that tend to make rules of origin a contested terrain, are
likely to decline in importance in the foreseeable future. Second, the
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preferential rules of origin, which are more important protectionist sites
than the non-preferential rules, are excluded from the HWP.  Third, the
need for periodic revision of harmonised rules of origin, especially in
the absence of well defined procedures for introduction of amendments,
leaves scope for ‘privatisation’ of trade policy making even at the
international level.
Further, the new multilateral regime, even if it succeeds in
establishing semblance of an order in the arena of rules of origin, is
likely to have unequal effects on members. This is so because even
though the harmonised rules are common rules, they differ significantly
across product groups. There is no generally accepted norm for deciding
what will or will not qualify for substantial transformation. The rigor
and stiffness of the test of last substantial transformation, which is also
the test for originating status, vary significantly from one product group
to another. What rules will be finally adopted for each product in the
HWP would depend on hard bargaining as well as on balance of power
between interested parties. Therefore, the moot question is as to whether
the adopted harmonised rules match the trading interests of the
developing nations. An answer to the questions presupposes detailed
product specific analysis of alternative proposals of rules of origin. The
picture emerging from our analysis of outstanding disputes is not very
encouraging for the developing countries. The outstanding disputes
belong mainly to the traditional areas of western protectionism against
developing countries. The fear that the developed countries are trying
to manipulate rules of origin to compensate for the loss of tariff and
other conventional barriers, therefore, cannot be ruled out.
A perusal of developed country proposals, particularly in the area
of textiles and clothing, smacks of the protectionist intend.  The
developed countries, perhaps as a part of their preparations for the MFA
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phase-out in 2005, are trying to impose highly protectionist rules of
origin on the WTO membership.  The developed country proposals in
textiles and clothing if implemented would be detrimental to the South
Asian Countries.  They would deny the South Asian countries their
share of the gains of liberalization of trade in textiles and clothing.
Similarly, the developed country proposals in the area of tropical products
would tend to pre-empt future attempts to establish geographical
indications in such products. The message of textiles and clothing
underlines the need for more in-depth studies on new proposals of rules
of origin pertaining to other important areas of trade as well. It also calls
for continuous engagement with the issues of rules of origin from the
part of South Asian countries.
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Notes
1. Article 1 of the ARO defines rules of origin as those laws, regulations and
administrative determinations of general application applied to determine
the country of origin of goods except those related to granting of tariff
preferences.
2. For instance, the high cost of compliance with the rules of origin of an
importing country (administrative and technical costs involved, and the
need to keep the proof of origin) by itself can act as a trade deterrent.
Similar is the case of uncertainties associated with the determination of
origin status that add to the risk of exporters as well as importers.  A more
direct use of rules of origin as a protectionist tool emanates from the
imposition of stringent local content requirements. The local content
requirements invariably increase the consumption of factors of production
originating in the territories of contracting parties. A regime of stringent
rules of origin can also be used to attract investments into the markets of
the contracting parties (Hirsch 2002).
3. That many countries did not have formal, well-defined rules of origin does
not mean that they did not have any mechanism to identify the nationality
of origin of commodities. Since nationality of origin of most products
traded was fairly obvious and uncontentious they probably did not require
well-defined rules of origin.
4. The Customs Cooperation Council is now renamed as the World Customs
Organization.
5. The exporters of finished products subjected to an anti-dumping order
may just shift the components or materials to another country for
manufacturing the finished product and circumventing the dumping order.
This is what is alleged to have happened in the case of the US anti dumping
order against colour television receivers from Korea (Palmeter 1990:32).
6. The above conceptualization of the rules of origin can also be used to rank
alternative origin systems according to their impact on the net trade creation
effects of the PTA. For instance, according to Stephenson and James
(1995), an origin system based on the CTH rule would result in higher net
trade creation than those based on process rule or value-added rule.  There
are, however, few studies, which take up the above question at the empirical
level.
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7. Vermulst (1997:467) speaks about the difference in rules of origin
employed to determine the domestic status in the context of anti-dumping
duties and government procurement. Also see footnotes to Articles 1 and
2 of the ARO.
8. Further, since the demand for inputs is a derived demand the adverse
impact on the final goods industry would get ultimately transferred to the
input producing industry as well.
9. If the advalorem criterion is prescribed the method for calculating this
percentage shall also be indicated.  And if the criterion of manufacturing or
processing operation is prescribed, the operation that confers origin on the
product concerned shall be precisely specified.
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